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damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves" (1994, 25) . Given that its absence can cause injury, Taylor reasons that recognition therefore "is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need" (26) . Articulated in this way, recognition's appeal is undeniable: "It expresses an attractive ideal, envisioning a world in which people could all find their own identities accurately and respectfully reflected in the mirror of their shared social and political life" (Markell 2003, 3) .
Despite recognition's promise, critiques of multiculturalism expose the untenable foundations on which recognition is built. On Taylor's account of the politics of recognition, group rights, institutionalized in law, afford the respect and dignity demanded by those in need of recognition. Taylor himself toward the end of his article wonders whether rights should serve as the binding force for what might, in the end, be a moral problem: "Perhaps we don't need to ask whether it's something that others can demand from us as a right. We might simply ask whether this is the way we ought to approach others" (1994, 72) . For political theorists and philosophers, the more immediate issue is how recognition might be institutionalized in a system of rights-how rights might serve as the mark of successful recognition. They demonstrate that within a liberal democratic framework grounded in individual rights, the politics of recognition requires law to accommodate what are essentially illiberal demands based on group identities. For some, the task is to show how group demands can be met within a system of rights-how demands for recognition of group identities are not in fact inconsistent with individual rights (see Kymlicka 1995) . For theorists working within the paradigm of deliberative democracy, the task is to show how legal rights do not and cannot grant recognition once and for all. In these works, imagining the politics of recognition means refiguring it as both a continuing practice of public debate and a public norm rather than as an end in itself: "Recognition in theory and practice should not be seen as a telos or end state, but as a partial, provisional, mutual, and human-all-too-human part of continuous processes of democratic activity in which citizens struggle to change their rules of mutual recognition as they change themselves" (Tully 2000, 477) . As a process that relies on contestation and the productive frenzy of debate, recognition does not signal for these theorists a singular act or event but rather an ongoing process, a deliberation over (the rules regulating) the terms of recognizability (see Habermas 1994) . For Nancy Fraser in particular, recognition is best understood as a "folk paradigm"-a set of "linked assumptions about the causes of and remedies for injustice" (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 11) -that provides reasons for why demands for recognition bind "all who agree to abide by fair terms of interaction under conditions of value pluralism" (31). What this reframing in critical scholarship exposes is that the multiculturalist ideal of a politics of recognition does not account for the conditions in which demands for recognition are met.
Although this critique was prominent in early engagements with multiculturalism, much of the scholarship since has seized on the seemingly unbreakable bond of recognition and identity logics. Recognition, we learn, "rests on a simplified understanding of subject formation, identity and agency in the context of social hierarchy" (McNay 2008, 2) . To detail the complexities lost in the presumptions of the politics of recognition, a virtual industry of scholarship has emerged. For some, the difficulty of such a politics is that it collapses individual and collective identities. K. Anthony Appiah argues, for instance, that recognition of group identities risks reproducing the violent, "tyrannical" relationship between dominant society and underrepresented groups in the relationship between an individual and the group with whom she identifies. Group identities produce "scripts"-"proper ways of being"-that suppress individual autonomy and difference in the name of earning and maintaining recognition (Appiah 1994, 162-63) . For others, it is not the normative force of collective identities that renders recognition problematic but its attachment to identity in the first place. Patchen Markell shows that because identity appears as a "coherent self-description that can serve as the ground of agency, guiding or determining what we are to do" (2003, 36) , the pursuit of recognition becomes synonymous with the pursuit of sovereignty. The result is that a politics of recognition invokes and fixes identity as a stable expression of who we are, misrecognizing the ways we exist in the middle of a politics that betrays the vulnerability of our autonomy and the instability of our becoming. Still others find recognition unworkable because it reinforces or bolsters existing structures of power, concealing the violence and oppression that play out in recognition's practice. Scholars locate this violence in different dimensions of recognition: in the way that it produces symbolic change rather than economic redistribution (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 12) ; in the way that it "diverts attention from the role of the powerful, of the misrecognizers, in these interactions, focusing on the consequences of suffering misrecognition rather than on the more fundamental question of what it means to commit it" (Markell 2003, 18) ; in the way it constitutes the colonial subject's consciousness (Fanon 1967) ; in the way that it, à la Hegel, entails 372 a life-and-death struggle that is then somehow supposed to give way to "compassionate personal relations, ethical social relations, or democratic political relations" (Oliver 2001, 4) .
In the wake of these critiques, visions of a politics of recognition grounded in identity have given way to critical accounts that seek to recuperate or reimagine the foundations of our shared political or ethical life in other terms. Some scholars heuristically remove recognition from the political scene in an effort to think its possibilities and limits in different registers (see Butler 2005) . Instead of being deployed as a norm intended to shape the landscape and relations of politics, the concept is employed as an analytic that might foster insight into the conditions in which subjectivity and ethical life emerge-reading for recognition's ontological and ethical implications. Other scholars, having seen what props up recognition, abandon the ideal altogether. Preferring to use concepts such as acknowledgment (Markell 2003; Hyde 2006) , witnessing (Oliver 2001) , or agency as embodied practice (McNay 2008), they investigate the possibility of an ethical intersubjectivity that can serve as a corrective to the violence or pathology of recognition.
If the first critical body of literature attempts to determine a proper place for recognition-one we might anticipate and welcome-the second body of scholarship that seeks other normative ideals renders a judgment on recognition's significance and efficacy for understanding and intervening in the world. Given this vast body of scholarship, we begin to understand how the proliferation of work on recognition threatens to become, like a well-fed gremlin after midnight, monstrous. As Ricoeur remarks, "There must be a reason that no widely recognized philosophical work of high reputation has been published with the title Recognition" (2005, 1). Recognition appears across a variety of works as both the instrument of a more democratic and ethical life and as the ruse that allows us to believe we are free and equal-even as we become further subjected to structures of power that render us complicit with injustice. It is accorded "dual significance . . . as both a descriptive tool and a regulative idea" (McNay 2008, 2) . It is both solution and problem. While the multiplicity of recognition's meanings, uses, and registers is itself not problematic, it does pose a problem of referentiality that threatens to make recognition into everything and nothing all at once. To study recognition, to read for its potential or its limits, is to pose the inevitable question: to what does recognition refer?
This special issue does not set out to answer this question by fixing recognition's referent. Instead, it wagers that this question becomes a question for us, in part, because we have not yet fully understood how recognition entails or is imbricated with referentiality, meaning making, place making. In short, we have not yet fully understood the rhetorical conditions in which this question might be raised. The articles that follow set out to do this work. Authors were invited to critically examine recognition in its different forms and to define its rhetorical contours. Articulated in this way, the invitation asked authors to do more than offer thoughts on how rhetorical perspectives and acts of criticism might illuminate recognition-assuming that we might indeed be able to locate recognition and bring it to light. If we understand a contour as an outline-or, more precisely, as the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines it, as "an outline especially of a curving or irregular figure"-the task set out was to examine how the figuration of recognition (how its taking place as a commonplace) operates or is given form or shape in and through rhetoric. An investigation of the rhetorical contours of recognition encourages a consideration of how rhetoric acts to constitute, perform, represent, flesh out, and trouble forms of recognition, and so this issue suspends, if only for a short time, a judgment about the value of recognition in the context of legal, political, ethical, or theoretical controversies in order to probe its rhetorical conditions, practices, and power.
Admittedly, this collection of articles might defy the expectations of its audience. For too long, the terms in and through which recognition has been addressed, theorized, and critiqued have been set in such a way that to raise the question of the rhetorical contours of recognition, to ask after the implications of its (theoretical) histories and deployments, and to question how these very terms have taken up a place in the narratives we tell about recognition means that what follows might be unfamiliar, even unrecognizable, as a "rhetoric of recognition." Authors were invited, encouraged even, to invoke diverse definitions, traditions, and theorists of the term. As a result, the articles do not settle on or begin from a single definition of recognition, nor do they even all accept the commonplace treatment of recognition as a practice of intersubjectivity through which individuals are validated by those around them. Alongside the Fichtean and Hegelian concept of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) that drives discourses of multiculturalism and identity politics, the contributors also draw on the concept in both its Aristotelian form (anagnôrisis) and in the derivatives of its French form (reconnaître). In Aristotle's Poetics, anagnôrisis is the element of a plot structure that enables a shift from ignorance to knowledge. While lesser known than Aristotle's 374 concept of reversal (peripeteia), anagnôrisis represents a recognition scene in which the author-somewhat artificially or shoddily, Terence Cave tells us-resolves the plot (as, for example, when Sophocles has Oedipus discover who he is). Importantly, though, the passage from ignorance to knowledge is "different from rational cognition. It operates surreptitiously, randomly, elliptically and often perversely, seizing on precisely those details that from a rational point of view seem trivial" (Cave 1990, 10) . The French reconnaî-tre, according to Ricoeur, has "three major senses": to grasp something in thought; to accept something as true; and to "bear witness through gratitude that one is indebted to someone for" (2005, 12) . Introducing these different forms of recognition into the collection unsettles the presumptions-about knowledge or recognition's scene, for example-that underwrite its wellknown accounts, holding open the possibility of reflecting on the value of rhetoric for larger discourses on recognition.
Read together, these articles then redefine what it means for recognition to be a "keyword." Setting aside the question of the term's significance, they invite us to consider how recognition's word(s) permit(s) passage. That is, they allow us to explore how an understanding of the rhetorical conditions and practices of recognition move subjects, objects, scenes, and speech or transform them into something they were not already. They signal the need and desire to think about how recognition's practices are authorized in the constitution of its word(s). They imagine the various shapes recognition might take in order to open a view onto our shared life. They give us pause to ask onto what or through what recognition passes, illuminating the ways that the place of recognition has so very much to do with how recognition takes place.
There is a conceptual movement, a shape, in the way these articles are organized; they themselves move and transform. One opens a set of questions that the next addresses or affirms or troubles-not in a seamless way, of course, but in a way that allows us to see how the contours of recognition appear in the (various) words about its words. Conceptually, the articles move us from a question of the language of recognition to its ethical implications for life, passing us onto its political scene and opening to a question of aesthetic experience. In the article that begins this collection, Erik Doxtader comments that "one irony of the ongoing debate over the relative merits of recognition is that it frequently turns (to) language only when it can be mustered and used as evidence for how competing positions unduly rely on the shifting and contingent-mere-nature of words." Noting that contemporary discourses of recognition falter when they approach the question of language-even as recognition is staked out in terms of voice and speakability-he poses a question that several articles in the collection take up: "Does recognition assume language in a way that precludes the recognition of language?" For Doxtader, this question occasions a turn to Walter Benjamin's "On Language as Such and on the Language of Man," which he draws on to explore in both content and form how Benjamin "grasps that the language of recognition may awaken in the recognizability of language." Philippe-Joseph Salazar reframes Doxtader's question to ask not about the recognizability of language generally but the recognizability of a (philosophical) concept. Drawing on a militarized sense of recognition-found in the root of "reconnaissance"-as the seizure and control of territory, Salazar examines what it might mean to "give due recognition to what shapes the territory of Marxism." He studies Engels's "interference" in the publication of Marx's Thesen über Feuerbach, to show that "Engels transforms a draft into a prologue, the prologue into a canon, the canon into a grid, the grid into a code, and thus is created the territory of the concept called 'Marxism.'" For Salazar, the seizure of this territory, and the status of the Theses, turns on the way in which readers of the text, including Heidegger and Sartre, are themselves "reconnoitered."
The three articles that follow explore the ways insight into the rhetorical contours of recognition are conditioned by and craft the terms of life. Elizabeth A. Povinelli questions whether the form of power that seizes our attention today-biopolitics and its governance of life-is appropriate for understanding the complexity of power in postclimate change political landscapes. Answering that the foundations of biopolitics have started to crumble, she introduces the concept of "geontological power" as a way to think about how power operates in late liberalism through the "maintenance of the self-evident distinction between life and nonlife." Interested in explaining how "nonhuman and, more importantly, nonliving 'agents'" are being "politically managed," she argues that the call for the recognition of the "(in)animate other," if it is to escape the fate of the calls for recognition of "the essential humanity of the other," must "disrupt the logos of demos rather than simply [be] allowed to enter into it." Concerned too with contemporary forms of the governance of life, Stuart J. Murray returns to Hegel's life-and-death struggle in the Phenomenology of Spirit, arguing that this struggle for "mutual recognition is perplexing . . . precisely because it presumes the immediacy of a 'life' that can be staked and risked, negated in a particular way-through the threat of death, through anxious mortification." To grasp how life in Hegel's work rhetorically conditions recognition, Murray examines "the spaces between nature and spirit sarah k. burgess 376 (today we might read: nature and culture)," in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature and "Anthropology," spaces that for Hegel "are populated by 'monstrous' and 'pathological' figures that appear (only to disappear) in the transition from nonhuman (animal) forms-of-life to a life that is recognizably human and self-reflexive." In offering a genealogy of life in Hegel's work, Murray imagines a form of recognition as "carnal knowledge," a kind of knowledge that might be able to "critically account for-and subvert-the ways that modern biopolitics produces its own monsters as the necessary conditions of biopolitical life." Kelly Oliver "relate[s] witnessing and response ethics to an earth ethics grounded on our shared bond to our singular home, planet earth" as a way to respond to theories of recognition that ground their ethical claims in the vulnerability of human life. These theories are problematic for her because they assume, first, that the recognition of vulnerability will necessarily lead to ethical relations and, second, that vulnerability marks a "uniquely human subjectivity or humanity." Noting that "vulnerability is shared with nonhuman animals," she calls for a form of "witnessing as ongoing address and response between earthlings and their environments [that] cannot be reduced to recognition, mutual or otherwise."
A consideration of the ethics of life opens onto an examination of the politics of recognition's scene and how it might bring about justice. James Martel considers the "political and rhetorical implications of misinterpellation," a concept he defines as "the misfiring of scenes of interpellation" in which an "an unintentional and uncontrolled kind of calling-one at cross-purposes with a conventional calling-can lead to radical outcomes." Engaging the work of Louis Althusser and his interlocutors, Martel details the way mishearing the call-responding to it as if you were the one for whom it was intended-is able to subvert the established authority and social norms "from deep within the heart of normativity and subjectivization." The value of misinterpellation then is that it "constitutes a potential antidote . . . to the otherwise generally overwhelming and irresistible power of global capitalism and liberalism, as well as to the phantasms that such systems produce." Both and Wendy Hesford and I examine the nature of the scene of address in order to understand the possibilities for critique in political practices of recognition. I analyze theoretical accounts of legal recognition and outline the costs of presuming that law is the frame or container of the scene of recognition. Without an account of law's rhetorical power-which is what is lost in political theoretical accounts-recognition seems bound to reproduce a form of violence and injustice. I contend, however, that if we refigure the relationship between law and recognition's scene, we are able to see how "the scene of recognition is set not by the law itself but by a demand for recognition in and through which both subjects and law take (up a) place." Hesford details the rhetorical conditions of five different scenes of recognition, "which emerge as central to scholarly and activist understandings of and responses to racialized state violence and point toward the sociopolitical objectives that recognition is expected to perform." Her article is meant to "elucidate how race as an analytic, racial politics, and racial in/justice in the United States are tied to recognition and how these ties delimit critiques of and activism against state violence." The possibility of this critique lies for Hesford in the ability to "foreground the constitutive dimensions of recognition in political subjectivity" and "reveal the interplay between survivorship, the replication of power hierarchies within and across groups who are recognized, and classically liberal and neoliberal mechanisms of sociopolitical exclusion and dispossession." Isaac West takes on a specific scene of political recognition, the marriage equality debate, using it to discuss the political potential of analogies. Specifically, he studies various "like race" analogies used to bolster claims for LGBTQ rights in order to caution against "the categorical rejection of [these] analogies as irredeemably flawed argumentative resources for gaining recognition as equal citizens." Claiming that "analogizing is as much an act of marking differences as it is generating points of similarities," he suggests that an understanding of the provisionality of analogies might create new forms of knowledge and foster political relationships across difference.
In the final article of the collection, Maurice Charland explores how a language of recognition might help to make sense of aesthetic experience, specifically the blues. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, and Paul Corcoran, he outlines a "politics of aesthetic recognition" through which we come to see that "the blues expresses a fundamental element of human experience and in doing so participates in bringing the modern world to presence." He claims that "the significance of art and specifically of the blues to the politics of recognition goes beyond the representation or the relaying of others' voices, in that it calls forth modes of being-there over against difference." His reflections on the blues and aesthetic recognition point toward the need to (re)consider the relationship between rhetoric and art, terms that "share a great deal" and yet remain distinct. If we accept Charland's claim that "art's finality is the reworking of the pathos of being-there in the world in and through revealing and disclosing in itself," then we are returned with new eyes and ears to the question of the experience of language in recognition in which the collection began.
